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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appellate review proceeding arises from the Labor Commission's August 
28, 2009, Order Amending ALJ's Decision and Affirming Denial of Benefits. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78A-4-103 (2009), § 63G-4-403 (2008), § 34A-2-801(8) (1997) and 
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Was Petitioner, Richard Norris an employee of Respondent, Harold 
Van Adams or was he an independent contractor? 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law which is reviewed under a 
broad abuse of discretion standard where appellate review gives no deference to the 
agency's determination, because the appellate court has the power and duty to say 
what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Drake v. 
Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d 177,182 (Utah 1997). Such an Issue is reviewed 
for correctness. LaSal Oil Co. V. Department of Environmental Quality. 843 P.2d 
1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Sierra Club v. Utah Solid Hazardous Waste Control 
Board. 964 P.2d 335 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope of the Utah 
Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize that the Act is to be liberally 
construed and any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the 
Petitioner. E.g., State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051, 
1 
1053 (Utah 1984); and McPhiev. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 
1977). 
Issue 2: Was Mr. Norris was in the course and scope of his employment with 
H. Van Adams when he injured his back while lifting an air compressor at the job site 
on December 26, 2005? 
Standard of Review: This is a mixed question of law and fact on which this 
Court extends "heightened deference" to the Commission's determination "with 
varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between a review of'correctness and 
a broad 'abuse of discretion' standard." Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1977). 
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope of the 
Utah Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize that the Act is to be 
liberally construed and any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the 
Petitioner. See citations above. 
Preservation for Appeal: All of the above issues were raised by Petitioner 
before the Labor Commission. A Petition for Review was timely filed with this Court. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULE 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2005) provides the overall statutory basis for 
an award of workers' compensation benefits to an employee arising out of and in the 
course of employment. Section 34A-2-102 (2005) of the Code fleshes out the 
definitions of "employer" and "employee" in determining workers' compensation 
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responsibilities. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: The Petitioner seeks review of a final Order of the Utah 
Labor Commission denying his claim for worker's compensation benefits. 
Course of Proceedings: 
1. On February 6, 2006, Richard Norris filed an Application for Hearing with 
the Labor Commission of Utah seeking temporary total disability compensation, 
recommended medical care, and unpaid medical expenses on account of an injury 
arising out of and in the course of his employment with Respondent Harold Van 
Adams. (R1 at 1-3). 
2. Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceedings was sent out on March 3, 
2006. (R1 at 8-9) 
3. RespondentVanAdamsfiledanAnsweronApn'13,2006. (R1at13-14) 
and Respondent Uninsured Employer's Fund ("UEF") filed their Answer on April 3, 
2006. (R1 at 15-17). 
4. A Notice of Formal Hearing was issued by the Labor Commission on 
April 5, 2006. (R1 at 18). 
5. Respondent UEF filed a Pretrial Disclosure Form on May 23,2006. (R1 
at 21-23). Respondent Van Adams filed Pretrial Disclosures on June 19, 2006 and 
again on August 24, 2006. (R1 at 28-30, 45-49). Petitioner filed his Pretrial 
Disclosures on August 10, 2006. (R1 at 42-44). 
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6. Various Motions and letters to the Judge were filed before the hearing; 
however, because none of the Motions or letters are germane to the issues in this 
appeal, they are omitted for sake of clarity. 
7. A Hearing was held on September 26,2006 in Salt Lake City, Utah before 
Administrative Law Judge Lorrie Lima. On January 2, 2007, ALJ Lima entered 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order that although Petitioner was an 
employee of Respondent, his workplace injury occurred after his employment 
relationship had been terminated by the Respondent. She dismissed the case with 
prejudice. (R1 at 126-132, a copy of said Order is attached hereto as Addendum 
"A"). 
8. On February 1, 2007, Petitioner filed a Motion for Review of that decision 
with the Utah Labor Commission. (R1 at 133-146). Respondent UEF filed a 
Response to Motion for Review on February 19, 2007. (R1 at 147-170). 
9. On August 28, 2009, the Labor Commission issued an Order Amending 
ALJ's Decision and Affirming Denial of Benefits. The Labor Commission adopted 
the ALJ's Findings of Fact, but found that there was no employer/employee 
relationship between the parties; rather that Petitioner was an independent 
contractor and that in any event his workplace injury occurred after his employment 
had been terminated. (R1 at 185-189, a copy of said Order is attached hereto as 
Addendum "B"). 
10. Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Review with this Court on September 
4 
25, 2009. 
Statement of Facts: The relevant facts in this matter are as follows: 
1. Respondent Harold Van Adams is the owner of certain rental property 
consisting of eight apartments and one duplex located in Midvale, Utah. Mark 
Warburton is Respondent's agent and manages the units, collecting the monthly rent 
from Respondent's tenants and serving as the contact person if a tenant needed any 
repairs. In response to a tenant complaint, Mr. Warburton would contact a 
repairman to perform the repair service. (R. at 127). 
2. On or about November 22, 2005 Mr. Warburton hired Petitioner to "fix 
up" three vacant vandalized apartments owned by Respondent, so they could be 
rented again. "Fixing up" included among other things removing garbage, raking 
leaves, cleaning and repairing holes in walls, patching holes, painting, and a sand 
job. (Id, including footnote 2; see also R. 3 at 3- 4). 
3. Petitioner testified that Mr. Warburton agreed to pay him $40.00 per 
hour and that his title was Job Foreman. (R3. at p. 3, 4). The Labor Commission 
found that the budget for the entire project was $1,500.00, including Petitioner's 
labor and supplies (R1 at 186, including footnote 1). Mr. Warburton told Petitioner 
to keep track of his hours and the cost of his supplies and gave Petitioner 
approximately $600.00 in cash to begin the job. Petitioner kept time sheets for the 
hours he and his helpers worked, as well as receipts for supplies he purchased for 
the job. (R. 3 at 14-17; R. 1 at 76-115). 
5 
4. Mr. Warburton provided Petitioner with some supplies and a trailer to 
haul away garbage and requested that he store his tools in a garage located on the 
rental property. (R. 1 at 128). 
5. Petitioner's job was to do whatever Respondent or Mark Warburton 
asked him to do. (R. 3 at 4). For example, Petitioner testified that on Mr. 
Warburton's instructions, he hired others to assist him, and that Mr. Warburton 
instructed him on how much and how often to pay these workers. (R. 3 at 18-19, 
21). Mr. Warburton denied giving Petitioner instructions with respect to hiring 
helpers. (R. 3 at 113-114, 134). 
6. Petitioner testified that Mr. Warburton gave him a list of cleaning 
supplies to buy for these workers and told him to buy them inexpensively, such as 
at a dollar store. (R. 3 at 19-20, 21). Mr. Warburton denied giving such a list. (R. 
3 at 134). 
7. At Mr. Warburton's instruction, Petitioner boarded up windows, changed 
locks, replaced thermostats, repaired drywall, a pothole, a gutter spout and a toilet 
handle, tore out carpeting, determined where leaks occurred and purchased 
cleaning supplies and paint. Mr. Warburton asked Petitioner to change the locks on 
four of the apartments that were empty. Mr. Warburton asked Petitioner to replace 
some thermostats in the apartments (R. 3 at 41, 127, 131). At Mr. Warburton' 
request, Petitioner even showed a rental unit to a prospective tenant. Mr. Warburton 
gave Petitioner a Rental Application for the tenant. (R. 1 at 128). 
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8. Petitioner testified that whenever there was a disagreement on how to 
fix a problem, Mr. Warburton had the final say. For example, Mr. Warburton 
instructed him to use particle board to fix a damaged floor, rather than plywood as 
Petitioner had suggested. Mr. Warburton told Petitioner to fill a pothole with 
concrete rather than asphalt as Petitioner had suggested. Mr. Warburton told 
Petitioner how to fix some down spouts outside the building. Mr. Warburton told 
Petitioner to use trash bags rather than a trash can. (R. 3 at 24-25, 31-32, 34, 43-
44). Mr. Warburton stated he did not recall a disagreement over a pothole, though 
he stated he remembered Petitioner fixing one. He stated he did not recall a 
disagreement over using trash cans or bags. (R. 3 at 118). 
9. Petitioner testified that there were several times when Mr. Warburton 
interrupted him while he was working and asked him to do another task, such as 
inspecting a furnace or fixing a broken toilet handle. (R. 3 at 25). 
10. Petitioner testified that on one occasion when he received a request 
from a tenant to fix a broken cabinet hinge, he called Mr. Warburton for instructions, 
and was told not to fix it. (R. 3 at 26). 
11. Petitioner testified that Mr. Warburton hired some painters and told 
Petitioner to go to Home Depot and buy supplies for the painters and to supervise 
them. Mr. Warburton introduced Petitioner to the painters as the "Job Foreman." 
(R. 3 at 30). Mr. Warburton denied this, stating that he did not think anybody 
supervised the painters and that he thought he bought all the paint for the project 
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himself. He stated that he did not hire Petitioner as a Job Foreman (R. 3 at 115, 
132, 136). 
12. Petitioner testified that Mr. Warburton came by the work site for the 
most part every couple of days or so. (R. 3 at 26). The Labor Commission found 
that Mr. Warburton specifically visited the site on November 27,2005, and was upset 
over the progress on the units. Mr. Warburton was subsequently out of town for 
about a week and was bedridden with pneumonia for ten days. After this, Mr. 
Warburton visited the job site once a week until December 23rd, 2005. (R. 1 at 186). 
13. Petitioner testified that during the last couple of weeks that he worked 
for Respondent, that Respondent Van Adams personally took control over the 
project. He gave Petitioner time limits on completing certain projects, such as four 
hour limits each on fixing plaster in the stairways and power washing the building. 
(R. 3 at 28). Respondent also instructed Petitioner on how to do his work, telling him 
to fix a hot water heater by replacing the washers rather than using a steel braided 
hose as Petitioner suggested, and telling Petitioner to focus his efforts on the outside 
of the building rather than the inside. If Respondent's instructions conflicted with Mr. 
Warburton's instructions, Petitioner assumed that Respondent's instructions 
prevailed. (R. 3 at 45-47). Respondent denied that he or Mr. Warburton in any way 
supervised Petitioner. (R. 3 at 181). 
14. The Labor Commission found that on December 6, 2005, Respondent 
paid Petitioner $4,000.00 and told him to wrap up the project, which was still 
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incomplete at that time. (R. 1 at 186). 
15. Respondent sent Petitioner a Form 1099 as tax documentation for all 
sums paid to him. The IRS, however, subsequently determined that Petitioner was 
an employee and required a W-2, with appropriate deductions for Federal and State 
Taxes and other required withholdings. (R. 1 at 123, R. 3 at 52, 147-148). 
16. At some point, the exact date of which was disputed, Petitioner and 
Respondent had a "falling out." Petitioner testified that the dispute was because 
Respondent owed him money for work he had done on the apartments. (R. 3 at 72-
73). Respondent testified that he had paid Petitioner enough for what he called 
"shoddy workmanship" and that Petitioner was "out of control." (R. 3 at 171-172). 
17. The Labor Commission found that on December 23rd, 2005, Petitioner 
requested an additional $9,800.00 for services and supplies he had provided. 
Respondent refused to pay and ordered Petitioner to leave the premises. (R. 1 at 
186). Petitioner however testified that the "falling out" occurred shortly before or 
shortly after New Year's Day, 2006. (R. 3 at 72-73). 
18. On January 10, 2006 Respondent requested that Petitioner complete 
a spreadsheet to account for how much time he worked, traveled and spent. 
Respondent declined to pay for the additional time such an itemized accounting 
would require and it was thus never provided. (R. 1 at 118-119,128; also R. 3 at 99, 
185). 
19. At Respondent's instruction, Petitioner had been using an industrial 
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wheel barrow designed air compressor in order to sand blast the outside of the 
building. The air compressor weighed about 300-350 lbs. (R. 3 at 7, 8). 
20. On December 26,2005, Petitioner and his helper named Max came to 
the job site to pick up the air compressor. Petitioner and Max lifted the air 
compressor a little less than three feet from the ground onto the truck bed. 
Petitioner lifted one end of the air compressor or one-half of the weight of the 
machine. Petitioner testified that he twisted his torso when he lifted the machine. 
He experienced almost immediate pain in his lumbar spine. After the accident, 
Petitioner did not return to work at either the rental property or anywhere else. (R. 
1 at 129; see also R. 3 at 7-10). 
21. After his injury, Petitioner tried to contact Mr. Van Adams and Mr. 
Warburton several times by telephone and e-mail, but he never received any 
response for either of them. (R. 3 at 10, 11). 
22. On January 27, 2006 Petitioner was seen by Dr. Frederic Civish for a 
physical and complained of rapidly increasing back pain. (R. 2 at 6-9). 
23. On February 24, 2006, Dr. Civish completed a Summary of Medical 
Record. Dr. Civish opined a medical nexus between Petitioner's accident on 
December 26,2005 and Petitioner's physical complaints. He stated that Petitioner's 
injury was new and not an aggravation of a preexisting condition and recommended 
that future treatment of Petitioner would be medication and possible physical 
therapy. (R. 2 at 4, 5). 
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24. On June 15, 2006, Dr. Joel Dall conducted an Independent Medical 
Evaluation (IME) of Petitioner, at Respondent's request. Dr. Dall opined that 
Petitioner presented symptoms of lumbar strain that were causally related to the 
accident on December 26, 2005. Dr. Dall further opined that Petitioner was not 
medically stable and he required treatment. Dr. Dall recommended that future 
medical treatment of Petitioner's condition could include physical therapy and a 
consultation with a psychiatrist. (R. 2 at 10-15). 
25. On August 11, 2006, Dr. Civish extended Petitioner's disability period 
from December 26, 2005 to September 1, 2006. Dr. Civish released Petitioner to 
light duty work with a permanent restriction to perform no physical labor. However, 
no light duty work was offered to Petitioner. (R. 2 at 1). 
26. On August 11,2006, Dr. Civish completed another Summary of Medical 
Record wherein he opined that Petitioner cannot do any job involving lifting, bending, 
or pushing and that he had a permanent impairment of less than 5%. (R. 2 at 2). 
27. At the time of his injury, Petitioner was not married and he did not have 
any depended children. Petitioner's weekly compensation rate was $609.00, the 
maximum rate. (R. 1 at 127). 
28. There was no evidence that Respondent Van Adams was insolvent or 
unable to pay workers compensation benefits to Petitioner. Uninsured Employers 
Fund (UEF) had no liability at the time of the Hearing with respect to any benefits 
which may be owed to Petitioner. (R. 1 at 130). 
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29. Following an evidentiary Hearing, Administrative Law Judge Lorrie Lima 
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on January 2,2006, finding 
that although Petitioner was an employee of Respondent Harold Van Adams and 
that he had suffered an injury on the work site, the injury had occurred after he had 
been discharged and thus was not compensable. She dismissed all of Petitioner's 
claims. (R. 1 at 126-132, a copy of said Order is attached hereto as Addendum "A"). 
31. The Utah Labor Commission entered its Order Amending ALJ's 
Decision and Affirming Denial of Benefits on August 28th, 2009, adopting Judge 
Lima's Findings of Fact. (R. 1 at 185-189, a copy of said Order is attached hereto 
as Addendum "B"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner was an employee of Respondent Harold Van Adams. Petitioner 
meets both the statutory definition of an employee contained in the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act, as well as the common law requirements of "supervision or 
control." Respondent exercised sufficient control over Petitioner's work activities so 
as to legally make him an employee regardless of how Respondents otherwise 
characterized the parties relationship. 
Although Petitioner's workplace injury occurred after the date Respondents 
alleged he had been terminated he is nonetheless entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits as his activities on that date fell within the scope of his employment. 
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A R G U M E N T 
I 
PETITIONER WAS AN EMPLOYEE AND NOT AN INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR AT THE TIME OF HIS WORKPLACE INJURY. 
The threshold question is whether Petitioner functioned as an independent 
contractor or an employee of Respondent Harold Van Adams. The Workers' 
Compensation Act (the "Act") at § 34A-2-401 (2005) requires employers to provide 
workers' compensation insurance coverage to employees. 
The Act fleshes out the definitions of "employer" and "employee" in § 34A-2-
104(1)(b) (2003) were "employee" is defined as: 
(b) a person in the service of any employer, as defined in 
Section 34A-2-103, who employs one or more workers or 
operatives regularly in the same business, or in or about 
the same establishment: 
(I) under any contract of hire: 
(A) express or implied; and 
(B) oral or written; 
(ii) including aliens and minors, whether legally or 
illegally working for hire; and 
(iii) not including any person whose employment: 
(A) is casual; and 
(B) not in the usual course of the trade, 
business, or occupation of the employee's employer. 
The Act in § 34A-2-103(2)(a) defines "Independent Contractor" as: 
"Independent contractor" means any person engaged in 
the performance of any work for another who, while so 
engaged, is: 
(i) independent of the employer in all that 
pertains to the execution of the work; 
(ii) not subject to the routine rule or control of 
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the employer; 
(iii) engaged only in the performance of a 
definite job or piece of work; and, 
(iv) subordinate to the employer only in 
effecting a result in accordance with the employer's 
design. 
The question of whether one is an employee or an independent contractor has 
been before the Utah Appellate Courts since 1912, beginning with the case of 
Callahan v. Salt Lake City. 41 Utah 300,125 P. 863 (1912). More recently, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Commission. 562 P.2d 227 (Utah 
1977) stated that: 
The determination of the status of an employee is based 
on various factors and of primary concern is the control, 
direction, supervision and the right to control, direct or 
supervise on behalf of the employer. When the employer 
retains supervision and control of the work to be 
performed, the workmen are employees. (Emphasis 
added). 
id- at 228. 
In Averettv. Grange. 909 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 1995) the Utah Supreme Court 
held that: "In workers' compensation cases, this court has consistently held that 
whether an employer-employee relationship exists depends upon the employer's 
right to control the employee." Citing Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisbv. 678 P.2d 305 
(Utah 1984) the Court clarified that "It is not the actual exercise of control that 
determines whether an employer-employee relationship exists; it is the right to 
control that is determinative." Id. at 309. 
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In Mitchell v. Rice. 885 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1994) this Court held that in 
determining whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee that: 
We look primarily to the following factors: (1) whatever 
covenants or agreements exist concerning the right of 
direction and control over the employee, whether express 
or implied; (2) the right to hire and fire; (3) the method of 
payment, i.e., whether in wages or fees, as compared to 
payment for a complete job or project; and (4) the 
furnishing of the equipment, (citations omitted). Id. at 821. 
The application of the above principles of law invariably leads to the legal 
conclusion reached by Administrative Law Judge Lima that Petitioner was an 
employee of Respondent Harold Van Adams. 
A. Direct Evidence of Right of Control. 
Petitioner testified that his job was essentially to do whatever Respondent Van 
Adams or his agent Mark Warburton told him to do. "They [Van Adams and 
Warburton] gave me lots of different assignments and I just did whatever they 
wanted, if I had the ability to do it." (R. 3 at 4). 
The ALJ made the Finding of Fact that Mr. Warburton was frequently on the 
job site and expressed his dissatisfaction with what he regarded as the lack of work 
accomplished on the rental units. (R. 1 at 127). The record is replete with examples 
of the control that Mr. Warburton and Respondent exercised. The ALJ found that 
Respondent's agent, Mr. Warburton, instructed Petitioner to among other things; 
board up windows, change locks, replace thermostats, repair drywall, a pothole, a 
gutter spout and a toilet handle, tear out carpeting, determine where leaks occurred 
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and purchase cleaning supplies and paint. On one occasion Petitioner even showed 
a rental unit to a prospective tenant at Mr. Warburton's direction. He hired painters 
and other helpers at Mr. Warburton's request. (R. 1 at 126-131). These Findings 
of Fact were adopted by the Labor Commission. (R. 1 at 185). 
Petitioner testified that whenever there was any disagreement on how to fix 
a problem that Mr. Warburton had the final say and that he frequently overruled 
Petitioner and gave specific instruction on how he wanted repairs done. (R. 3 at 24-
25,31-32,34,43-44). 
The Petitioner further testified that during the last couple of weeks that he 
worked for Respondent, that Mr. Van Adams personally took control over the project. 
He gave Petitioner time limits on completing certain projects and specific directions 
on how he was to do certain repairs. (R. 3 at 28, 45-47). 
B. Right to Hire and Fire. 
Petitioner did not have the authority on his own initiative to hire others to assist 
him. Mr. Warburton, however did on occasion direct him to hire others to assist him 
and instructed Petitioner on how much and how often to pay those workers. (R.3 at 
18-19,21). Mr. Warburton testified that Petitioner did not have the authority to hire 
others and that he [Warburton] hired the painters and others. (R. 3 at 115, 132, 
136). It is undisputed that Petitioner did not have the authority to fire any of the so 
called "helpers." 
In Ludlow v. Industrial Commission. 65 Utah 168, 235 P.884 (1928), Mr. 
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Justice Thurman, speaking for the Court noted: "An independent contractor can 
employ others to do the work and accomplish the contemplated result without the 
consent of the contractee, while an employee can not substitute another in his place 
without the consent of the employer." Id at 888. 
It is also undisputed that Petitioner himself was ultimately fired by 
Respondents. Professor Larson in his treatise on Workers' Compensation Law 
comments on the legal significance of such a termination: 
The power to fire, it is often said, is the power to control. 
The absolute right to terminate the relationship without 
liability is not consistent with the concept of independent 
contractor, under which the contractor should have the 
legal right to complete the project contracted for and to 
treat any attempt to prevent completion as a breach of 
contract. 
Larson's Workers' Compensation, § 61.08 [1] (11/02). 
C. The Method of Payment. 
In English v. Kienke. 848 P.2d 153,157 (Utah 1993) the Utah Supreme Court 
elaborated on the significance of the method of payment. 
Speaking in generality: an employee is one who is hired 
and paid a salary, a wage or at a fixed rate, to perform the 
employer's work as directed by the employer and who is 
subject to a comparatively high degree of control in 
performing those duties. In contrast, an independent 
contractor is one who is engaged to do some particular 
project or piece of work, usually for a set total sum, who 
may do the job in his [or her] own way, subject to only 
minimal restrictions or controls and is responsible only for 
its satisfactory completion. 
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Although the projected budget for the Holden Street repairs was $1500.00, 
including Petitioner's labor and supplies, Mr. Warburton agreed to pay Petitioner at 
the hourly rate of $40.00 per hour. He was told to keep track of his hours and the 
cost of his supplies. (R. 3 at 14-17; R. 1 at 76-115). The Labor Commission in its 
Order states that although Petitioner testified that he was to be paid hourly that they 
"find the other testimony more credible." (R1 at 186, including footnote 1). The 
Commission however never specifies what that "other testimony" was, but 
presumably it was the alleged $1500.00 budget for the needed repairs. 
The allegation that Petitioner was to be paid only a set sum is belayed by the 
clear documentary evidence that he kept time sheets and receipts. The Labor 
Commission makes a contradictory Finding of Fact that "On December 6,2005, Mr. 
Warburton and Mr. Van Adams paid Mr. Norton $4,000.00 and then surveyed the 
project, which was still incomplete." (R. 1 at 186, see also Labor Commission Order 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum B). This is entirely inconsistent 
with the Labor Commission's Finding that only $1,500.00 was to be paid to Petitioner 
for the entire job. 
Indeed, the Labor Commission goes on to indicated that on December 23, 
2005, Petitioner requested an additional $9, 800.00 for services rendered. It was at 
that point he was terminated and ordered off the rental property. (R. 1 at 186). 
Although the Labor Commission adopted the ALJ's Findings of Fact, it simply 
ignored them in significant part and relied on unspecified "other testimony" as more 
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credible, even though such testimony, if it even exists, is at odds with the specific 
Facts recited by the Commission in its Order. 
The ALJ found the Petitioner to be an employee. The Labor Commission 
adopted the same Findings of Fact, but reached a different legal Conclusion. While 
such a result is possible, it is required that the Commission engage in adequate Fact 
Finding to support its legal conclusions. 
In reviewing the factual findings of an administrative agencies the appellate 
Court reviews the "whole record" before the court and considers not only the 
evidence supporting the Agencies factual findings, but also the evidence that "fairly 
detracts from the weight of the [Commission's] evidence." The agency's findings of 
fact will be affirmed only if they are "supported by substantial evidence." Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). See also, 
Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission. 800 P.2d 330,335 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied. 
815P.2d241 (Utah 1991). 
The Labor Commission's Conclusion that the Petitioner was not an employee 
is not supported by "substantial evidence" or even the preponderance of the 
evidence which it specifically found. 
Finally, although not legally binding, it is of some evidentiary value that 
Respondents attempted to pay Petitioner pursuant to a Federal Tax Form 1099, 
which typically would be used for an independent contractor. The IRS however 
disallowed the 1099 and required Respondents to issue instead a W-2 Form, with 
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appropriate deductions. (R. 1 at 123, R. 3 at 52, 147-148). Thus, the United States 
government made an official determination that Petitioner was an employee and not 
an independent contractor. 
D. The Furnishing of Equipment. 
The ALJ specifically found (and the Labor Commission adopted that Finding) 
that the Petitioner used his own tools and truck to repair the rental units. They were 
to be stored in a garage located on the rental property "per Mr. Warburton's 
request.." Respondent purchased paint and cleaning supplies for Petitioner to use 
and also provided a trailer so Petitioner could haul garbage away. Petitioner was 
instructed to buy other required supplies and to keep receipts so he could be 
reimbursed. (R. 1 at 127-128). 
The ALJ made a specific finding that Petitioner worked for Respondent as an 
employee with respect to the repair work on the rental property in Midvale, Utah. (R. 
1 at 131, see also Addendum "A"). 
When one views the totality of the evidence, specifically focusing on the 
element of control as indicated in the above four areas, the evidence is 
overwhelming that Petitioner was an employee and not an independent contractor. 
II 
PETITIONER WAS IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
WHEN HE SUFFERED A COMPENSABLE WORKPLACE INJURY. 
A. Injury Arising Out of And in The Course of Employment. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 34A-2-401 provides for specified workers 
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compensation benefits for injuries"... by accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment. 
The ALJ devoted only a single paragraph to the discussion of this issue, 
although it served as the sole and exclusive basis for her denial of any and all 
workers compensation benefits to the Petitioner. In rendering her decision on this 
point, the ALJ cited no case law or statutory support. The sole basis for her 
determination on this point was her conclusion that: 
Petitioner's accident and related medical condition occurred on 
December 26,2005, after the employment relationship was severed by 
Respondent. Accordingly, Petitioner did not sustain an injury within the 
time and space boundaries of the employment and in the course of an 
activity whose purpose was related to his employment with 
Respondent. (R.1 at 131, see also copy attached hereto as Addendum 
"A"). 
The Labor Commission paid even less attention to this pivotal issue, 
relegating it to two short sentences in a footnote as follows: "The Commission notes 
that regardless of whether Mr. Norris had proven he was an employee of Mr. Van 
Adams, the employment relationship had ended at the time of the accident. Thus, 
Mr. Norris would still not have been entitled to workers' compensation benefits." (R.1 
at 187, see also Addendum "B" hereto). No other analysis on this point is provided 
by the Commission. 
In reviewing the factual findings of an administrative agencies the appellate 
Court reviews the "whole record" before the court and considers not only the 
evidence supporting the Agencies factual findings, but also the evidence that "fairly 
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detracts from the weight of the [Commission's] evidence." The agency's findings of 
fact will be affirmed only if they are "supported by substantia! evidence." Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
As noted above, there is significant dispute as to when the employment 
relationship was severed. Although Respondent testified that it occurred on 
December 23, 2005, that testimony is inherently self serving. It is extremely 
convenient, and suspect, that Respondent claims to have terminated his 
employment relationship with Petitioner just shortly before Petitioner is injured on the 
job. 
In fact, there is no independent documentary evidence to show that 
Petitioner's employment was terminated on December 23, 2005, as alleged by 
Respondent. Petitioner acknowledged that the parties had a falling out, but testified 
that he was not terminated until approximately New Years Day, 2005. Petitioner's 
testimony is support by the fact that he continued to perform work for Respondent 
after December 23rd, when he was allegedly terminated. 
In particular, Petitioner had worked for approximately three hours at the 
Holden Street job site on December 26th before he was injured. Respondent's 
testimony that Petitioner had been discharged on December 23rd and had "taken his 
tools and left" is disproved by the undisputed fact that Petitioner was injured on 
December 26th while removing his air compressor from the work site. There was no 
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dispute that the Petitioner was injured on that date and on Respondent's property 
while loading his work tools in his truck. 
B. Liability For Workers Compensation Benefits Can Extend for 
a Reasonable Period Past the Exact Time of Termination. 
Even if one was to assume that Petitioner was discharged on December 23, 
2005, some three days before his industrial injury, that alone would not defeat his 
entitlement to workers compensation benefits. 
Professor Larson in his well acknowledged treatise on Workman's 
Compensation Law states as follows: 
Compensation coverage is not automatically and instantaneously 
terminated by the firing or quitting of the employee. The employee is 
deemed to be within the course of employment for a reasonable period 
while winding up his or her affairs and leaving the premises. 
* * * * * * 
... [T]he allowed interval should be long enough to encompass the 
incidents that flow directly from the employment, although they may 
take effect after employment has technically ceased. Larson's 
Workers's Compensation Law, Section 26.01 (Rel. 94-07/05). 
Although there is no Utah case law directly on point, the law from other 
jurisdictions is replete with authority for the extension of workers compensation 
coverage past the exact time of termination. For example, coverage has been held 
to extend through a lunch period after discharge. Nicholson v. Industrial 
Commission, 76 Ariz. 105,259 P.2d 547 (1953). Workers' compensation coverage 
has also been required for injuries sustained when, following termination the former 
employee returns to the worksite to collect his or her final pay, even when that 
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occurs days later. St. Anthony Hospital v. James. 889 P.2d 1279 (Okla. Ct. App. 
1994). 
Professor Larson noted, "Collecting one's personal effects on leaving 
employment is logically no different from collecting one's pay, since both are 
necessary incidents of an orderly termination of the employment relation". Larson's 
Workers' Compensation Law, § 26.04 (Rel. 94-06/05). 
In Herman v. Sherwood Industries. Inc., 244 Conn. 502, 710 A.2d 1338 
(1998), a case remarkable similar to the facts of this case, the claimant was 
discharged and was told to retrieve his tools from the loading dock. When he lifted 
the tools, he injured his back. As these tools were kept on the employer's premises 
for the benefit of both the claimant and employer, and as it was at the employer's 
suggestion that the claimant retrieved his tools, the accident was held to have 
occurred during an activity that was incidental to employment and was covered. 
In Nails v. Market Tire Co.. Inc., 29 Md. App. 154, 347 A.2d 564 (1975) a 
discharged employee alleged that he injured his back while lifting his tools he had 
returned to retrieve two days after being fired. The Maryland Court found that his 
injury arose in the course of his employment. 
In this case, it should be noted that December 23rd, the date Respondent 
alleges Petitioner was terminated was a Friday. The time of day of the alleged 
discharge was not testified to. Even if one were to resolve the conflict in the 
evidence as to the date of termination in favor of the Respondent, it must be 
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recognized that the following day; a Saturday, was Christmas Eve and the day after 
that was Christmas. Due to the size and weight of the air compressor, Petitioner 
needed help loading it and it is only reasonable that he would have to return latter 
with the needed help. No one disputes that his injury occurred on Monday, 
December 26th, is a very short and reasonable time after the alleged discharge, 
especially in light of the intervening holidays. 
Petitioner's injuries occurred on Respondent's property, while Petitioner was 
retrieving his work tools. There was evidence that Petitioner was still employed on 
that date and had been rendering services for the Respondent, his employer. Even 
if the injury occurred "post termination," he would still be entitled to workers 
compensation coverage because he was injured during "a necessary incident of an 
orderly termination of the employment relationship." 
Ill 
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY IN 
FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO 
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED 
WORKER. 
Few principles of workers compensation law are as well established in this 
State as that workers' compensation disability claims are to be liberally construed in 
favor of awarding benefits, and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be 
resolved in favor of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this principle 
from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); 
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J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission. 661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. 
Industrial Commission. 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission. 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977); Baker v. Industrial Commission. 405 P.2d 
613 (Utah 1965); Askren v. Industrial Commission. 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & 
K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, first discussed the proper 
construction of the Workers' Compensation Act and the underlying purposes of the 
Act, and stated as follows: 
[0]ur statute requires that the statues of this state are to be 
'liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and 
to promote justice. 
* * * * * * 
The beneficent purpose of such acts are therefore apparent to 
all, and for that reason, if for no other, should receive a very liberal 
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are all united upon 
the proposition that in view of the purposes of such acts, in case there 
is any doubt respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as the case 
may be. id- at 1021-1022. (Emphasis added). 
Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in the record, it must be resolved 
in favor of the injured worker and the awarding of benefits. The Act is to be 
construed in favor of protecting the employee. 
The Labor Commission in its Order failed to properly apply this vital rule of 
construction. Its Findings and Conclusions do not evidence a "liberal construction" 
and "resolution of doubt in favor of the claim." 
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CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons above cited, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court of 
Appeals reverse the Labor Commission and direct that the case be remanded to the 
Administrative Law Judge for the entry of an award of benefits. 
DATED this 4th day of February, 2010. 
Melvin A. Cook 
Counsel for Petitioner, Richard Norris 
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Addendum A 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Administrative Law Judge Lorrie Lima 
(January 2, 2007) 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
PO Box 146615 





HAROLD VAN ADAMS and/or 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 06-0127 
Judge Lorrie Lima 
HEARING: Room 336, Utah Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on September 26, 2006, at 1:00 p.m. The hearing was pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Lorrie Lima, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Richard Norris, was present and represented by Melvin A. 
Cook, Esq. 
The respondent, Harold Van Adams, was present and represented himself. 
The respondent, Uninsured Employers Fund, was represented by Sharon J. 
Eblen, Esq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND CASE PROCEEDINGS 
On February 9, 2006, Richard Norris (Petitioner) filed an Application for Hearing and 
claimed the following workers compensation benefits: Medical expenses and temporary total 
disability compensation. Petitioner asserted that he sustained an industrial accident on December 
26, 2005. 
On March 3, 2006, a Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceedings and Order for 
Answer was issued by the Utah Labor Commission (Commission). 
On March 31, 2006, Harold Van Adams (Respondent) filed an Answer and denied that 
he and Petitioner had an employment relationship. 
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On April 3, 2006, the Uninsured Employers Fund (UEF) filed an Answer and asserted 
that Petitioner was an independent contractor and that his accident did not occur in the course 
and scope of his employment as he did not have an employment relationship with Respondent. 
At the hearing, Petitioner's Motion to Compel filed on September 15, 2006, was 
denied for failure to follow Utah Administrative Code, Rule 602-2-l.F. Petitioner's Motion to 
Continue the hearing was denied. 
At the hearing, Petitioner amended his claim for workers compensation benefits to 
include recommended medical expenses, temporary partial disability compensation, permanent 
partial disability compensation and travel expenses. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Employment and Compensation. 
A. Wage. 
On December 6, 2005, Respondent paid, or had already paid, to Petitioner a total of 
approximately $4,500. Petitioner was not married and he did not have any dependent children. 
Petitioner's weekly compensation rage was $609.00, the maximum rate. 
B. Employment Agreement. 
On or about November 22, 2005, Petitioner and Mark Warburton1 agreed that Petitioner 
would fix up three vacant vandalized rental units in Midvale, Utah. The rental property, eight 
apartments and one duplex, were owned by Respondent. Mr. Warburton informed Petitioner that 
the budget for fixing up2 the apartments was $1,500.00 which included Petitioner's wage and 
services and supplies. Petitioner informed Mr. Warburton that he could complete the repairs in 
three to four days. At that time, Mr. Warburton gave Petitioner approximately $600.00 in cash. 
Mr. Warburton requested that Petitioner keep a record of the hours he worked on the apartments 
and copies of any receipts of materials that he purchased to repair the rental units. 
The Sunday following Thanksgiving, Mr. Warburton visited the rental units. Mr. 
Warburton was upset about what he opined was the lack of work accomplished on the units. At 
that time, Petitioner turned in the time that he had spent working on the units and receipts for 
supplies that he had purchased. Mr. Warburton noted that Petitioner's calculations exceeded the 
budgeted amount of $1,500.00. Mr. Warburton informed Petitioner that he did not expect 
Petitioner to perform a "Class A" job but to finish the work so that the units could be rented. 
1
 Mr. Warburton collected monthly rent from the tenants for Respondent. Respondent paid to Mr. Warburton a 
percentage of the rent that he collected. Mr. Warburton was also the contact person if a tenant needed a repair. In 
response to a tenant's complaint, Mr. Warburton would contact a repairman to perform the repair service. 
2
 "Fixing up" the rental units consisted of removing garbage, raking leaves, cleaning and repairing holes in walls, 
patching holes, painting and a sand job. 
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Petitioner used his own truck and tools to repair the rental units. Mr. Warburton provided 
a trailer to Petitioner to haul garbage away. On Mr. Warburton5s instruction or consent, 
Petitioner boarded up windows, changed locks, replaced thermostats, repaired drywall, a pothole, 
a gutter spout and a toilet handle, boarded up windows, tore out carpeting, determined where 
leaks occurred and purchased cheap cleaning supplies and paint. Petitioner used his own tools 
and stored them in a garage located on the rental property per Mr. Warburton's request. Mr. 
Warburton informed Petitioner that there were some cleaning supplies already purchased by 
Respondent and stored in the garage which Petitioner could use. Petitioner showed a rental unit 
to a prospective tenant and Mr. Warburton gave Petitioner a rental application for the tenant to 
complete. 
On or about December 1, 2005, Mr. Warburton left town for a training program and 
returned approximately one week-later. Petitioner gave to Mr. Warburton a summary of his-
work time and receipts for supplies which totaled approximately $4,500.00. Mr. Warburton gave 
the summary to Respondent. 
On or about December 6, 2005, Mr. Warburton and Respondent met with Petitioner. 
Respondent issued a check to Petitioner for approximately $4,000.00. Petitioner, Respondent 
and Mr. Warburton walked around the rental units to look at Petitioner's projects. Respondent 
was dissatisfied that the work was not completed. Respondent told Petitioner to wrap up the job. 
Petitioner informed Respondent that he would finish the repair work in one day. 
After December 6, 2005, Mr. Warburton developed pneumonia for 10 days and he did 
not visit the rental property. Respondent visited the rental property once a week and he 
continued to see Petitioner on the rental property although he did not know why he was there. 
On December 23, 2005, Respondent visited the rental property. Petitioner asked 
Respondent to pay him an additional $9,800.00 for completed work. In response, Respondent 
informed Petitioner that he had already paid him for shoddy workmanship. Respondent further 
informed Petitioner that he was "out of control." Petitioner continued to ask Respondent for 
payment and threatened him physically. Respondent ordered Petitioner off of his rental property. 
Petitioner collected his tools and left the rental property. 
Petitioner filed a mechanic's lien against Respondent for his repairs, materials and work 
services for a total of $8,907.32. On January 10, 2006, Respondent requested that Petitioner 
complete a spreadsheet to account for how much time he worked, traveled and spent. In 
response, Petitioner informed Respondent that if he wanted such an accounting he would charge 
$40.00 an hour. Petitioner did not provide an accounting to Respondent. On January 26,2006, 
Petitioner issued correspondence to Mr. Warburton and notified him that he intended to file a 
civil lawsuit against him and make a report to the US Immigration and Naturalization Services. 
On February 13, 2006, Petitioner issued correspondence to Respondent and informed him of his 
injury and threatened to file a lawsuit against him. 
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2. Accident and Medical Treatment. 
On December 26, 2005, Petitioner and a third party lifted an industrial, wheelbarrow 
designed air compressor into Petitioner's truck bed. The weight of the air compressor was 300 to 
350 pounds. Petitioner and the third party lifted the air compressor a little less than three feet 
from the ground into the track bed. Petitioner lifted one end of the air compressor or one-half 
the weight of the machine. Petitioner testified that he could have twisted his torso when he lifted 
the machine. He experienced pain in his lumbar spine. Petitioner did not seek medical treatment 
at that time. Following the accident, Petitioner did not return to work at either the rental property 
or anywhere else. 
Petitioner tried to contact Respondent and Mr. Warburton several times but he did not 
receive a response. Around the first part of January 2006, Mr. Warburton contacted Petitioner. 
On January 27, 2006, Petitioner was seen by Dr. Frederic Civish for a physical and 
complaints of rapidly increasing back pain. Medical Records Exhibit (MRE), 6. Dr. Civish's 
assessment was hypertension, insomnia, rectal bleeding and erectile dysfunction. MRE, 8. Dr. 
Civish referred Petitioner for a chest x-ray and colonoscopy. 
On February 24, 2006, Dr. Civish completed a Summary of Medical Record. MRE, 4. 
Dr. Civish opined a medical nexus between Petitioner's accident on December 26, 2005, and 
Petitioner's problems. Dr. Civish determined that Petitioner was released to usual work on 
February 28, 2006, although he stated that Petitioner was required to be off work to March 1, 
2006. Dr. Civish opined that Petitioner's injury did not aggravate a preexisting condition. He 
recommended that future treatment of Petitioner would be medication and possibly physical 
therapy. 
On March 17, 2006, Dr. Civish completed a Summary of Medical Record. MRE, 3. Dr. 
Civish determined that Petitioner was required to be off work from December 26, 2005, to 
January 25, 2006, and he did not have a permanent injury. Dr. Civish added medication to his 
February 2005, recommendations for future treatment of Petitioner's condition. 
On June 15, 2006, Dr. Joel Dall conducted an independent medical evaluation of 
Petitioner. MRE, 10. Dr. Dall opined that Petitioner's present symptoms, lumbar strain, were 
causally related to the accident on December 26, 2005. Dr. Dall further opined that Petitioner 
was not medically stable and he required treatment. Dr. Dall recommended that future medical 
treatment of Petitioner's condition could include physical therapy and a consultation with a 
physiatrist. 
On August 11, 2006, Dr. Civish extended Petitioner's disability period from December 
26, 2005, to September 1, 2006. MRE, 1. Dr. Civish released Petitioner to return to light duty 
work with a permanent restriction to perform no physical labor. 
Currently, Petitioner experiences back pain from time to time when he stands or drives a 
care. He takes an over-the-counter pain medication, ibuprofren, daily. 
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3. Liability of the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
None of the parties introduced any evidence that Respondent stood insolvent or unable to 
pay any workers compensation benefits to Petitioner. Therefore, the UEF incurred no liability at 
this time with respect to any workers compensation benefits owed to Petitioner. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers Compensation Act provides various medical and 
disability benefits for the workers "injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment. . .." Thus, in order to receive benefits for an injury, a claimant must meet each of 
the Act's three threshold requirements: (1) The injury was accidental, (2) the injury arose out of 
employment, and (3) the injury arose in the course of employment. 
1. Employment Relationship. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that: 
[i]t will almost always follow that if the evidence shows that an "employer" 
retains the right to control the work of the claimant, the claimant is the 
employer's employee for workmen's compensation purposes (citations 
omitted). Certainly the concept of right to control is not to be rigidly and 
narrowly defined. Rather it should be defined to give full effect to the 
remedial purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act. (citations omitted). 
•K *K »H H» 
Many factors have been applied in determining the right to control. Among 
those factors are actual supervision of the worker, the extent of the 
supervision, the method of payment, the furnishing of equipment for the 
worker, and the right to terminate the worker, (citations omitted). 
Although these factors are not inclusive, they are relevant in many cases. . .. 
Bennett v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). 
Petitioner worked for Respondent as an employee with respect to the repair work on the 
rental property in Midvale, Utah. Mr, Warburton, as an agent of Respondent, hired Petitioner an 
employee. Mr. Warburton provided Petitioner with specific directions and some supplies, with 
instructions to buy other inexpensive supplies, in order to perform the repair work. Mr. 
Warburton provided a trailer to Petitioner to haul away garbage and he instructed Petitioner to 
store his tools in a building located on the rental property. Although Mr. Warburton was not 
present on the rental property on a frequent basis when Petitioner initially began the repair work, 
he and Respondent inspected Petitioner's work often enough to conclude that they were 
dissatisfied with the how long Petitioner took to complete the projects. Furthermore, Respondent 
also determined that Petitioner's work was shoddy. Respondent paid Petitioner the original 
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agreed upon amount of $1,500.00 plus approximately $3,000.00 more. Finally, Respondent 
terminated Petitioner and ordered him off of the rental property. 
2. In The Course Of Employment 
On December 23, 2005, Respondent refused to pay Petitioner's request for additional 
payment of $9,800.00, and told him that his services were no longer required on the rental 
property. Respondent ordered Petitioner of the rental property. In response, Petitioner collected 
his truck and tools from the property and left. On the basis of those facts, Respondent terminated 
the employment relationship with Petitioner on that day. Petitioner's accident and related 
medical condition occurred on December 26, 2005, after the employment relationship was 
severed by Respondent. Accordingly, Petitioner did not sustain an injury within the time and 
space boundaries of the employment and in the course of an activity whose purpose was related 
to his employment with Respondent. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's claims for medical expenses, 
recommended medical care, temporary total disability compensation, temporary partial disability 
compensation, permanent partial disability compensation and travel expenses are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED this 2nd day of January, 2007. 
Lorrie 
Administrative Law Judge 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their response$ to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on January Si , 2007, to the 
persons/parties at the following addresses: 
Melvin A Cook Esq 
139 ES Temple Ste 300 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Harold Van Adams 
5293 E Elkhorn Cir 
Eden UT 84310 
Sharon J Eblen Esq 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
U ^ I I X A B O R COMMISSION 
Clerk, Adjudication Division 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
Addendum B 
Order Amending ALJ's Decision and Affirming Denial of Benefits 
Utah Labor Commission 
(August 28, 2009) 




HAROLD VAN ADAMS and/or 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND, 
Respondent. 
ORDER AMENDING 
ALJ'S DECISION and 
AFFIRMING DENIAL 
; OF BENEFITS 
Case No. 06-0127 
Richard Norris asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge Lima's 
denial of benefits to Mr. Norris under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Title 34A, Chapter 2, 
Utah Code Annotated. 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to § 63 G-
4-301 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and § 34A-2-801(3) of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Mr. Norris claims workers' compensation benefits from Harold Van Adams and the 
Uninsured Employers Fund ("UEF") for a back injury that allegedly occurred on December 26,2005. 
Judge Lima held an evidentiary hearing and found Mr. Norris was an employee of Mr. Van Adams 
but at the time of the accident, Mr. Norris was no longer an employee. Therefore Judge Lima denied 
benefits. 
In his motion for review Mr. Norris argues that he was Mr. Van Adams' employee at the time 
of the accident and entitled to benefits. He further argues that it was error for Judge Lima to dismiss 
his claim with prejudice. Mr. Van Adams and the UEF argue that Mr. Norris was hired as an 
independent contractor and was never an employee. They further argue that even if the Commission 
found Mr. Norris was Mr. Van Adams' employee, this relationship ended on December 23, 2005. 
Therefore Mr. Norris's injury of December 26, 2005, did not arise out of and in the course of his 
employment and is not compensable. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts Judge Lima's findings of facts. The facts relevant to the issues in 
the motion for review can be summarized as follows: 
On November 22, 2005, Mr. Warburton, Mr. Van Adams' agent, offered to pay Mr. Norris 
$1,500 to "fix up" three vacant and vandalized apartments. This amount included labor and 
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supplies.1 The project required Mr. Norris to repair dry wall, plumbing, furnaces, and perform 
sandblasting. Mr. Norris was given $600 initially and was asked to keep a record of the hours he 
worked and copies of any receipts for materials he purchased. Mr. Norris began working on the 
apartments using his own truck and tools, including his air compressor for sandblasting. Some 
cleaning supplies were already available, as was a trailer for hauling away waste, and Mr. Warburton 
instructed Mr. Norton that he could use these. 
On November 27,2005, Mr. Warburton visited the apartments and was upset by the lack of 
progress on the units. Mr. Norris also provided Mr. Warburton receipts for work and material that 
exceeded the allotted $1,500 budget. Mr. Warburton then left town for approximately a week. 
When~he returned, Mr. Norton presented his summary for work time and supply receipts totaling 
approximately $4,500. On December 6,2005, Mr. Warburton and Mr. Van Adams paid Mr. Norton 
$4,000 and then surveyed the project, which was still incomplete. Mr. Norton was told to wrap up 
the job and he responded he would in one day. 
Mr. Warburton was then bed ridden for the next ten days due to pneumonia and was not able 
to get to the site. When he was better he visited the site once a week, up until December 23, 2005. 
On that date, while Mr. Van Adams visited the property, Mr. Norris asked for an additional $9,800. 
Mr. Van Adams refused, advising him he was already paid, and ordered him off the rental property. 
Mr. Norris threatened Mr. Van Adams physically and later, sent him letters threatening to make 
reports to INS. 
On December 26,2005, Mr. Norris was at the job site lifting his air compressor into his truck 
when he allegedly injured his back. On January 27, 2006, Mr. Norris first reported back pain, 
among other ailments, to his doctor. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The issue before the Commissioner is whether Mr. Norris was an employee of Mr. Van 
Adams and injured in the course of his employment or whether he was an independent contractor and 
therefore not entitled to benefits. Section 34A-2-103(7)(a) of the Workers5 Compensation Act 
provides "[i]f any person who is an employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for the 
employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision or control, and this work 
is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer" the contractor is considered an employee 
of the original employer. 
In Bennett v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 726 P.2d 427 (1986), the Utah Supreme Court 
held: 
1
 The Commission notes Mr. Norris testified that he was offered $40 an hour to complete the 
project. However, after reviewing the evidentiary record, the Commission finds the other 
testimony more credible. 
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Many factors have been applied in determining the right to control. Among those 
factors are actual supervision of the worker, the extent of the supervision, the method 
of payment, the furnishing of equipment for the worker, and the right to terminate the 
worker. Although these factors are not inclusive, they are relevant in many cases 
Id. at 430 (citations omitted). 
In this case, Mr. Norris was advised he would be paid a certain amount of money to perform 
a job—cleaning and fixing up three vacant and vandalized units. When the supplies exceeded that 
initial amount, Mr. Van Adams authorized another payment and advised him to get it done. Mr. 
Norris provided his own tools for the work, used his own truck, and was responsible for purchasing 
most of the supplies for the work,, with the exception of the cleaning supplies that he was told he 
could use. Mr. Norris had no supervision over his work and he decided his own work schedule for 
completing the project. Several days after starting the project, Mr. Warburton came to see the 
progress and expressed his frustration that it was taking so long. He visited the site approximately 
three additional times over the next few weeks, on one occasion accompanied by Mr. Van Adams 
wherein they expressed additional frustration with the delay. This minimal interaction did not 
amount to any form of supervision over Mr. Norris. Further, the work Mr. Norris performed was not 
"part or process in the trade or business" of Mr. Van Adams' business, as required under the statute. 
The Commission finds under the facts of this case that Mr. Norris acted as an independent contractor 
and was not an employee of Mr. Van Adams. 
Mr. Norris also argues that his claim should not be dismissed with prejudice. However, Mr. 
Norris had the opportunity to fully argue and litigate his claim and was unsuccessful. The facts show 
he is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Thus, it was appropriate to dismiss the claim 
with prejudice. 
Finally, Mr. Norris argues that the principals of workers" compensation law in this state 
required the Commission to liberally construe the law in favor of awarding benefits. However, this 
principal does not relieve Mr. Norris from establishing he is entitled to benefits by a preponderance 
of the evidence, which he did not do. 
The Commission concludes that because Mr. Norris was not an employee injured in the 
course of his employment, he is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits for his injuries. The 
Commission hereby amends Judge Lima's decision to conclude that Mr. Norris was not an employee 
of Mr. Van Adams either prior to or at the time of the alleged injury, and affirms her decision 
denying benefits. 
2
 The Commission notes that regardless of whether Mr. Norris had proven he was an employee of 
Mr. Van Adams, the employment relationship had ended at the time of the accident. Thus, Mr. 
Norris would still not have been entitled to workers' compensation benefits. 
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ORDER 
The Commission amends Judge Lima's decision, as consistent with this order, and affirms 
Judge Lima's decision denying benefits. It is so ordered. 
Dated this o$ day of August, 2009. 
-7^-j h; 
Sherrie Hayasl^ i 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Amending ALJ's Decision and Affirming Denial 
of Benefits in the matter of Richard Norris, Case No 06-0127, was mailed first class postage prepaid 
this ^ 5ay of August, 2009, to the following: 
Richard Norris 
779 E 9400 S #302 
Sandy UT 84094 
Harold Van Adams 
5293 E Elkhorn Cir 
EdenUT 84310 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
Karen Helphand Designated Agent 
160E300S3rdFl 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 
Melvin A. Cook, Esq. 
139 ES Temple Ste 300 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Edward O. Ogilvie, Esq. 
160E300S3rdFl 
Box 146650 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
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